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Human factors deal with issues related to humans, their behavior and the physical aspect of the envi-
ronment in which they work. A control room is a complex system where operators perform plant
operation using control systems and carry out monitoring and administrative responsibilities. For safe
operation of industrial installation, the performance of the control room crew plays an important role. In
this respect, a well designed control room is crucial for safe and efﬁcient operation. The aim of this paper
is to propose a methodological framework applied to nuclear control room evaluation, through partic-
ipatory ergonomics, using operator activity analysis and human factors questionnaire as aid tools. We
describe a case study in which the methodology framework was used in the evaluation process of a
nuclear control room. The information gathered made possible a series of recommendation for the
adequacy of the control room design, assisting in the safety assessment of the nuclear plant operation
and justifying the alarm panel modernization.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Ergonomics is an inter-disciplinary research ﬁeld that focuses on
improving the functioning of the humanetechnology interaction
with regard to safety. This is accomplished by taking into account
the strengths and weaknesses of human performance. The goal of
the ergonomics is to achieve the best possible match between
products and users, in the context of the task to be performed. The
ergonomics incorporation in the system design, interfaces and
equipment offers a lot of opportunities for improvements with
regard to system effectiveness, efﬁciency, reliability and safety
(Luquetti dos Santos, Teixeira, Ferraz, & Carvalho, 2008).
Human factors are a body of scientiﬁc factors about human
characteristics, covering biomedical, psychological and psychoso-
cial considerations, including principles and applications in the
personnel selection areas, training, aid tools for job performance
and human performance evaluation (NUREG 0700, 2002). The hu-
man factors engineering (HFE) is the application of knowledge
about human capabilities and limitations to plant, system and.com.br, jaeron@bol.com.br
All rights reserved.equipment design, in order to ensure that the plant, system design,
human tasks and work environment are compatible with the sen-
sory, perceptual, cognitive and physical attributes of the personnel
who operate, maintain, and support it (NUREG 0711, 2002). Deﬁ-
nitions of ergonomics and human factors are complementary,
making reference to human capacities and limitations, work ac-
tivity, work system, environmental conditions and safety.
According to Gatto, Mól, Luquetti dos Santos, Jorge, and Legey
(2013), ergonomics and human factors research ﬁeld ﬁnd direct
application in the design or upgrade of industrial control rooms,
aiming to improve operational safety and reliability. This research
ﬁeld deals with the evaluation of human behavior during operation
experiments, by analyzing whether operators are able to track
adequately variables’ indications, to detect and identify correctly
abnormal operational conditions from the alarms indications, and
to act promptly to recover normal conditions.
A control room is deﬁned as a functional entity with an asso-
ciated physical structure, where the operators carry out centralized
control, monitoring and administrative responsibilities (ISO 11064,
2000). Most industrial installations have one or several control
rooms that function as safety critical barriers against major hazards.
It is thus of vital importance that the control room and humane
system interfaces should be designed according to human factors
principles.
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human factors requirements have been satisfactorily integrated
into design, development and evaluation of the control room;
ensure the necessary means for operators to perform their tasks
safely; ensure that the tasks to be performed by operators are
correctly speciﬁed; ensure that procedures and training re-
quirements are consistent with desired performance; ensure that
control room design is consistent with the cognitive characteristics
of operators, enabling a compatible human performance with the
desired mission; minimize human error; make available adequate
information about the status of systems, enabling the execution of
tasks by operators during normal and emergency situations. The
principal technical document in nuclear area that provides an
internationally accepted technical basis for human factors engi-
neering (HFE) is the NUREG 0711 (2002). The approach used in this
document deﬁnes the implementation of a human factors engi-
neering program in four phases: planning and analysis, design,
veriﬁcation/validation, implementation and operation. In these
phases are inserted the elements shown in Fig. 1. In each phase, the
following item are implemented: operational experience review,
reference system analysis, functional requirement analysis, func-
tions allocation, task analysis, human centered design, procedure
development, training; veriﬁcation/validation process; monitoring
human performance.
The phase related to control room design deﬁnes physical
arrangement of the control room, layout of the control desk, basicFig. 1. Human factors enrequirements of the humanesystem interfaces, deﬁnition of sys-
tems to be monitored in the control desk and basic requirements of
environmental conditions. The veriﬁcation and validation process
guarantee that all necessary controls, alarms and humanesystem
interfaces have been included in the control room design, so that
operators can performance efﬁciently the tasks in all modes of
operation.
Questionnaire is a series of written questions and inexpensive
way of gathering quantitative data that could be used to conﬁrm
hypotheses. Different methods can be used as quantitative and
qualitative tool to evaluate systems and human performance, such
as human factors questionnaire, analytic hierarchy process (AHP)
and fuzzy logic. Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a decision-
aiding tool for dealing with complex, unstructured, and multiple-
criteria discrete decisions (Saaty, 1996). Since its initial develop-
ment, AHP has been applied to a wide variety of decision areas,
such as aviation, nuclear and manufacturing.
According to Park and Lee (2008), numerous methods to
quantitatively estimate the human error probability (HEP) have
been developed. This study suggests a method using an analytic
hierarchy process (AHP), which quantiﬁes the subjective judgment
and conﬁrms the consistency of collected data.
Fuzzy set theory was designed to mathematically represent
uncertainty and provide formalized tools for dealing with the
imprecision intrinsic to many problems. Fuzzy can be used in many
areas in which human judgment, evaluation or decision aregineering program.
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fuzzy sets theory for accident scenario risk assessment. A typical
case study comprising a fault tree for rupture of the isobutane
storage tank was performed and a comparison between the tradi-
tional approach and fuzzy method was made.
The aim of this paper is to propose a methodological framework
applied to nuclear control room evaluation using ergonomic tools,
such as participatory ergonomics, design standards and operator
activity analysis. Ergonomic approach uncovers a series of impor-
tant features related to the control room operation that are not
detected by the traditional evaluation, based only on the human
factors standards. We describe a case study in which the method-
ology framework was used in the evaluation process of a nuclear
control room. The information gathered made possible a series of
recommendation for the adequacy of the control room design,
assisting operators to run the plant more efﬁciently, improving
plant and operator performance and justifying the alarm panel
modernization.
2. Control room evaluation
Countries have established and maintained the necessary reg-
ulatory framework to ensure the safety of its nuclear installations.
Nuclear installation shall not operate without a license, being
necessary a review process, including the documentation to be
presented at each phase of the project. The licensing process is
divided in several steps: site approval, construction license,
authorization for initial operation, authorization for permanent
operation and decommissioning. For the ﬁrst step is necessary to
take into account the factors related to the site that might
contribute to violation of established dose limits at the proposed
exclusion area. For the second step is necessary to perform a
detailed review and assessment of the information received from
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR). For the initial
operation authorization is necessary to review the construction
status, including results of pre-operational tests and update the
assessment of the plant design based on the information submitted
in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), including the license of
the reactor operators.
Humanesystem interfaces have signiﬁcant implications in the
safety, once they affect the mode that operators search for infor-
mation related with the status from the main systems, inﬂuence
the operator activity and determine the necessaries requirements,
so that the operators can understand and supervise the main pa-
rameters. The actions carried out by the operators are supported
through operation procedures, emergency procedures, alarm sys-
tems, communication systems, data presentation systems, control
systems and safety systems. Human factors standards are based
upon partial indications face to contemporary ergonomics issues,
not contemplating the inclusion of operator activity analysis in the
real workplace. Recent application from complexity theory for
work analysis (Marmaras & Pavard, 1999) has emphasized that
regulations compose a set of mechanisms strongly relevant for the
evaluation of complex systems.
Luquetti dos Santos, Farias, Beany, Falcão, and Marcelino (2011)
explained that human centered design emphasizes the use of er-
gonomics methods to collect human performance data, so that the
allocation of user needs in all phases of control room design can be
guaranteed. Human centered design should start at the earliest
stage of the project and be repeated iteratively until the system
meets the requirements.
Alarms are needed in the management of large industrial pro-
cesses. An alarm should help the operator to diagnose faults. It is a
signal indicating a combination of conditions that require the op-
erator’s attention. Alarm system developed according to operator’sworking conditions contributes to maintaining safe and efﬁcient
operation. Further, the alarm should require a physical or cognitive
response (Sørenssen et al., 2002).
The evaluation process of nuclear control room has recently
come into importance due to the recognition of the impact of hu-
man performance on system performance and the inadequacy of
traditional evaluation methods. According to Hollnagel (1985, pp.
21e26), there are three evaluation methods: conceptual, static and
dynamic.
Conceptual evaluation depends on extensive description and
knowledge of the system. It can be carried out by experts using
some tools as task analysis; operational experience revision; safety
analysis reports; design speciﬁcations; descriptions of panels,
workstation, graphical interfaces and diagrams showing ﬂows of
information.
Static evaluation is represented by samples taken from system
performance recordings using results of real system operation. It
concentrates on the way in which information is presented to the
operator and involves some form of interaction between system
and operators. One way to use static evaluation is by means of
questionnaires, checklists and human factors guidelines. The
advantage of this method is that it can use the expert knowledge.
The dynamic evaluation requires a detailed experimental plan-
ning, including training, data gathering, analysis system (process
state, process events), log of operator actions (human machine in-
terfaces, keyboard, touch screen) and audio, video recorder (verbal
protocols, communication). The process is simulated, the operators
have a degree of psychological involvement and they react to the
simulated process in a realistic manner. Full-scope simulation have
some important features that can be distinguished from ﬁeld
studies, being possible some control of the experiment or intro-
duction of transients that would be difﬁcult to perform in the real
world situation. It is not possible the introduction of special factors
as safety culture and managerial practices. During ﬁeld study,
operator activity analysis is understood through observation in
terms of gestures and postures, where the observer locates classes
of behavior that are recognizable and repeated during work
(Faverge, 1980). This analysis is based on what is observed, con-
versations and what is not said. It allows the observers to identify
not only actions related to prescribed work, but also side activities
which are either explicit (but not formulated in the frame of the
task description) or implicit. Implicit activities may be uncon-
sciously done by operators. Implicit activities are in many ways the
reason of cooperative work. What is discovered, through direct
observation or with the aid of cameras or recorders, is a set of
signals picked up by the operators in the information ﬁeld
(Marmaras & Pavard, 1999).
3. Methodological framework
In this item, the main phases of the methodological framework
are shown in Fig. 2.
The ﬁrst phase concerns multidisciplinary team formation. Ac-
cording to Luquetti dos Santos et al. (2011), participatory ergo-
nomics is an approach that involves experts and workers actively
engaged in system development and in the analysis of ergonomics
problems. The success of this approach is directly related to the
strength of group involvement. It is important that the group
realize the importance of participating in the process, to recognize
that the workers are experts at their jobs and that they can provide
valuable insight into design problems. This phase refers to the
proﬁle of the multidisciplinary team. The team included one hu-
man factors expert, one electronic engineer and two operators. The
human factors expert is an engineer with ﬁfteen years of experi-
ence in nuclear instrumentation design and ten years of experience
Fig. 2. Methodological framework.
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engineer has ﬁfteen years of experience in nuclear instrumentation
design. The control room operators are licensed operators with
ﬁfteen years of experience in the operation of research nuclear
reactors.
The tasks and responsibilities must be assigned to each team
member according to their technical capabilities. The human fac-
tors expert is the leader of the team, responsible by coordination
and management of the conﬂicts relative to team preferences. The
electronic engineer is responsible for tests and development
related to nuclear instrumentation modernization. Operators pro-
vided information to team members in response to questions
related to their work activities, needs, work practices and control
room operation.
The second phase concerns choice of methods and tools used in
the evaluation process of nuclear control room. The methods and
tools were selected based on what kind of information they pro-
vide, on what kind of information the team could use and on what
ergonomics methods could generate more high-quality descriptive
and predictive databases. Firstly, the multidisciplinary team
decided to use a human factors questionnaire adapted from the
questionnaire developed by Dos Santos, Grecco, Mol, and Carvalho
(2009). The human factors questionnaire was chosen because it is a
reliable method of research, that makes available a large group of
results in a condensed format, relatively quick to use and easy to
interpret the results. The familiarization of the operators with the
structure of the questions and the training received previously also
inﬂuenced the choice of the human factors questionnaire.
The operator activity analysis was the second tool chosen by the
multidisciplinary team.
The primary goal of any work analysis is to describe what the
operator does, placing it more precisely into its work environment,
describing the elements of the context that seem to inﬂuence the
operator behavior. Based on the scenarios chosen, work analysis is
carried out and interaction between the operator and systems is
described. It requires a detailed planning, including data gathering,
data analysis and audio, video recorder.
The fourth phase is related to the choice of the scenarios. The
multidisciplinary team decided to use the results of the human
factors questionnaire as inputs in the scenarios choice process. The
human factors questionnaire identiﬁes questions and requirements
that are not in compliance with the human factors guideline e
NUREG 0700 (2002), such as alarms, controls, panel layout and
panel label problems. The scenario choice was performed by themultidisciplinary team. The scenarios chosen were performed by
the operators and through operator activity analysis the data
related to operator performance were collected and analyzed.
At the end of operator activity analysis, the multidisciplinary
team identiﬁed and analyzed the human factors issues. Recom-
mendations were included in the modernization of the control
room.
The last phase is named development. In this phase, recom-
mendations suggested were incorporated in the system
development.
4. Material and methods
In this item, we describe the use of the methodological frame-
work applied to evaluation of a nuclear control room.
4.1. Field study
The research nuclear reactor is open pool and uses enriched
uranium. It was designed to operate at low power, allowing easy
access to experimental facilities. In the current core conﬁguration,
the reactor is being operated within the power range 170e
370 Watts. The principal area of the nuclear reactor comprises the
main control room, researchers’ room and reactor hall.
In the main control room, the operator monitors and controls
the nuclear process, recognizes disturbances that affect safety and
maintains the plant in safe conditions. The main control room is
subdivided into following sections (Fig. 3):
 control desk;
 safety system and nuclear instrumentation. They are posi-
tioned on the right side of the control console;
 communication system, physical monitoring system and ﬁre
prevention system. It is positioned on the right side of the
control console and close to safety rack and nuclear instru-
mentation rack;
 process instrumentation and radiation monitoring. It is posi-
tioned on the left side of the control console.
In the control desk, there are strip paper recorders that show the
variables evolution of the power channels; analogue meters that
show data related to pulse, linear and power channels; conductivity
meters; area radiation meters; and electronic modules. The oper-
ational parameters of the reactor are monitored by one operator
Fig. 3. Main control room.
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the control room.
The control room crew is composed of two licensed operators.
One of them is responsible for the diary operation of the reactor.
Another one is the support operator. The operators’ age typically
range from 35 to 45 years, and have more than 15 years of expe-
rience in nuclear operation. Aiming to protect the operators and in
accordance with safety standards established by the licensing
sector, the control room walls are shielded and isolated from the
reactor hall.4.2. Human factors questionnaire
Dos Santos et al. (2009) developed a questionnaire for the
veriﬁcation of human factors requirements in the nuclear control
desk design. The human factors questionnaire consisted of ques-
tions related to ﬁve areas, such as panel layout, panel label, infor-
mation displays, controls and alarms. In our study, we propose a
methodological framework applied to nuclear control room eval-
uation using multidisciplinary team, human factors questionnaire
adapted fromDos Santos et al. (2009) and operator activity analysis.
The adapted questionnaire consists of questions related to the same
ﬁve areas cited above, including another area called working
environment. The results were used as inputs during the scenarios
choices. In this way, scenarios performed by operator enabled the
identiﬁcation of actions that exhibit higher-level cognitive activity
and suggest systems to be modernized, such as alarm panel.
In this research, the questionnaire framework shown in Fig. 4
was developed. The questionnaire has been structured to cover
six areas, such as: panel layout, panel label, information displays,
controls, alarms and working environment. Sixteen questions are
related to panel layout (controls and displays arrangement, con-
troledisplays relationships and demarcation of panel layout). Ten
questions are related to panel label (labels formats, identiﬁcation of
units, consistent wording and separation). Six questions are related
to information displays (scaling conventions, numbering of scales
and uniformity of measurements units). Seven questions are
related to controls (pushbuttons, continuous adjustment controls,
thumbwheels, toggle switches, size uniformity and indication of
actuation). Eleven questions are related to alarms (indication,
location and conﬁguration). Eight questions are related to working
environment (workstation design, comfort, temperature, lightinglevel, acoustics, vibrations and noise level). The score of the human
factors questionnaire is deﬁned as the value of the conformance
scale multiplied by the importance weights, Eq. (1).
Score ¼ Conformance scale Importance weights (1)
Each feature of the control room is rated on a conformance scale,
shown below:
0: the requested design feature is complied with the human
factors guideline;
1: the requested design feature is partially complied with the
human factors guideline;
2: the requested design feature is not complied with the human
factors guideline.
Since some features may be more important than others,
importance weights can be assigned. The importance weights are:
3: the feature is mandatory;
2: the feature is desirable;
1: the feature is not important.
The score equals zero or 1 is related to low risk (L), 2 or 3 is
related to moderate risk (M), and 4 or 6 is related to high risk (H).
The human factors questionnaire is shown in Fig. 4. The item
named AREA identiﬁes one of the six areas: panel layout, panel
label, controls, alarms, working environment and information dis-
plays. The questions related to the six areas are included in the item
QUESTIONS. The explanations related to the questions are included
in the item INFORMATION. The conformance scale, the importance
weight and the score result are included in the item called SCORE.
The identiﬁcation of the nuclear risk as high (H), moderate (M) or
low (L) is presented in the item named RISK. The item named RE-
SULTS, represented as Eq. (2), presents the percentage of questions
evaluated as high risk (H). The number of questions evaluated as
high risk is deﬁned as HR. The number of questions for each area is
deﬁned as NQ. For the panel layout, NQ is equal to 16. For the panel
label, NQ is equal to 10. For the information displays, NQ is equal to
6. For the Controls, NQ is equal to 7. For the alarms, NQ is equal to 11.
For the working environment, NQ is equal to 8.
RESULTS ¼ ðHR=NQÞ  100% (2)
Fig. 4. Human factors questionnaire.
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factors questionnaire, focusing on the familiarization with the
questions. The team was asked to ﬁll in the conformance scale and
the importance weights for the questions related to panel layout,
panel label, information displays, controls, alarms and working
environment. The item RESULTS identiﬁed the areas with the
highest percentages of questions considered as high risk (H), that
were not in compliance with NUREG 0700 (2002). The multidisci-
plinary team discussed the results and decided to choose scenarios
that included the area considered as priority and the respective
questions evaluated as high risk (H).
The item SCORE was calculated and the identiﬁcation of the
nuclear risk (high, moderate or low)was presented in the item RISK
(Fig. 4). The Cohen’s Kappa index (Fleiss & Cohen,1973) was used to
assess the agreement level, related to item RISK, between two ob-
servers (inter-rater agreement). Numbers of agreements between
the multidisciplinary team were quantiﬁed and the Cohen’s Kappa
index was calculated.
4.3. Scenarios choice
According to Venable, Li, Ginter, and Duncan (1993), scenarios
usually include important situations and problems that exist in
some context form. It involves the recognition that many factors
may combine in complex ways to create situations and problems
that can affect the human ability to handle normal and abnormal
situations.
The multidisciplinary team discussed the human factors ques-
tionnaire results in an environment that supported free exchange
of experience. The results assisted the multidisciplinary team in the
choice of the scenarios, indicating the areas that could be incor-
porated in the scenarios. The multidisciplinary team selected two
scenarios that cover a broad spectrum of factors, based on the re-
sults of the human factors questionnaire. The process of con-
structing scenarios was very important, because it provided the
basis for the identiﬁcation of weak points in the control room
design and established a discussion about factors that affect oper-
ator performance.4.4. Operator activity analysis
It was carried out through structured observations and in-
terviews, considering the scenarios chosen by the multidisciplinary
team. The data collection has been effected through ﬁeld notes,
ﬁxed video cameras and photographs. The goal was to identify
human factors problems in the control desk design; whether in-
formation about operation was sufﬁcient and available; and iden-
tify the following cognitive functions: monitoring/detection;
situation assessment; response planning; response implementa-
tion (Hollnagel, 1998, chap. 9; Rasmussen, 1983). The monitoring/
detection address observation and identiﬁcation of signals, infor-
mation and data received by the operator. Situation assessment
describes how the operator interpreted and organized information
into a meaningful whole, in order to construct a coherent and
logical explanation to account for the observations. Situationmodel
is a mental representation that integrates operator understanding
about physical and functional aspects of the plant and plant sys-
tems (Mumaw, Swatzler, Roth, & Win, 1995). Situation model is
constantly updated as new information is received and operator
understanding of situation changes. Response planning refers to
the process of making a decision. It involves operator using situa-
tion model of the current plant state to identify goals, generate
alternative response plans, evaluate response plans, and select the
most appropriate response plan. Response implementation refers
to execution of the planned actions required to perform a task.
5. Results
In this chapter results are presented.
5.1. Questionnaire results
The human factors expert (HE), electronic engineer (EE) and the
operators (O1 and O2) ﬁlled in the answers for the questions pre-
sented in the questionnaire (Fig. 4). The agreement level of the
answers evaluated as high risk among the operator one and oper-
ator two (O1/O2), operator one and human factors expert (O1/HE),
Table 1
Cohen’s kappa test.
Team The kappa value (K)
O1/O2 0.78
O1/HE 0.77
O1/EE 0.76
O2/HE 0.77
O2/EE 0.76
HE/EE 0.76
Table 2
Results of human factors questionnaire.
Area Results ¼ (HR/NQ)  100%
Panel layout 0%
Panel label 20%
Information displays 0%
Controls 14%
Alarms 64%
Working environment 12.5%
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human factors expert (O2/HE), operator two and electronic engi-
neer (O2/EE), human factors expert and electronic engineer (HE/EE)
were quantiﬁed using the Cohen’s kappa statistics. The results of
the Cohen’s kappa test (K) were greater than 0.75 (Table 1). It
means that the degree of agreement among the multidisciplinary
team was good (Fleiss & Cohen, 1973). It gave an indication of the
consistency of the evaluation results and that the use of the human
factors questionnaire made possible the identiﬁcation of a set of
design problems and recommendations.
The areas and the questions evaluated as being of high risk (H)
were selected and considered during the scenarios choice. The re-
sults are shown in the Table 2.Fig. 5. Operator mo5.2. Scenarios chosen
The following requirements were used for scenarios choice:
scenarios involving issues related to operation safety and scenarios
that incorporate an speciﬁc array of variables based on the human
factors questionnaire (alarms, controls, panel label and working
environment), according to their probability of occurrence and
likely impact on the operation safety. Through meetings, the
multidisciplinary team discussed the selection and description of
the scenarios. Two scenarios were chosen. The ﬁrst one is related to
reactor start-up and increase in reactor power up to the level of
eighty percent of nominal power (scenario one). The second one is
related to the start-up and reactor shutdown due to alarm in the
gamma radiation monitoring device, located in the reactor hall.
5.3. Operator actions
The analysis was based on observations of the operator perfor-
mance under two scenarios. The human factors expert observed
how the operator interacted with the nuclear reactor systems. The
human factors expert paid particular attention to the operator
tasks, searching for deﬁciencies in operator response to normal and
abnormal situations. The analysis focused on how the systems have
supported situation awareness and decision making.
Interviews were carried out with the operator at the end of each
observation period, where critical decisions and strategies made by
the operators during scenarios were reviewed. One ﬁxed video
camera and a hand-held digital camera were used to support data
collection. The data collected consists of a total of six hours of
observation (three days of observation, two hours per day) including
startup tests, reactor startup, increase in reactor power up to the
level of eighty percent of nominal power and reactor shutdown.
In this phase, the operator monitoring model (Fig. 5), adapted
from the Mumaw et al. (1995) model, was used. This model
has three major elements: Initiating events, operator cognitivenitoring model.
Table 3
Scenario one.
Operator actions
1.0 Turn on power supply of the control desk
2.0 Check (Evaluate) indicator lamps
2.1 Observe indicator lamp “POWER SUPPLY” is ON
2.2 Observe indicator lamp “NEUTRON SOURCE IN” is OFF
3.0 Check (Evaluate) data from nuclear instrumentation
3.1 Observe the analogue meters of the pulse channel located in the control
desk: counts less than 10 pulses per second
3.2 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel located in the control
desk: no power
4.0 Record water conditions
4.1 Temperature
4.2 PH
4.3 Resistivity
5.0 Put the operation key in the position “SOURCE”
5.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and insert the neutron source
5.2 Observe indicator lamp “NEUTRON SOURCE IN” is ON
6.0 Check (Evaluate) data from nuclear instrumentation
6.1 Observe the analogue meters of the pulse channel located in the control
desk: counts greater than 10 pulses per second
6.2 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel located in the control
desk: no power
7.0 Put the joystick control in the position “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 1”
7.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the safety rod number
1 of the reactor core
7.2 Observe indicator lamp “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 1” is OFF
8.0 Put the joystick control in the position “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 2”
8.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the safety rod number
2 of the reactor core
8.2 Observe indicator lamp “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 2” is OFF
9.0 Put the joystick control in the position “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 2”
9.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the safety rod number
3 of the reactor core
9.2 Observe indicator lamp “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 3” is OFF
10.0 Turn on the power switch of the drain valve
10.1 Put the joystick control in the position “DRAIN VALVE”
10.2 Close “DRAIN VALVE”
10.3 Observe indicator lamp “DRAIN VALVE CLOSED” is ON
10.4 Put the joystick control in the position “WATER LEVEL”
11.0 Turn on the power supply of the main pump
11.1 Observe indicator lamp “MAIN PUMP” is ON
11.2Observe indicator lamp “WATER LEVEL HIGH” is ON
12.0 Check (Evaluate) data from nuclear instrumentation
12.1 Observe the analogue meters of the pulse channel located in the control
desk: counts increasing
12.2 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel located in the control
desk: no power
13.0 Turn on the key called “CONTROL RODS”
13.1 Observe indicator lamp “CONTROL RODS” is ON
13.2 Observe indicator lamp “CONTROL RODS IN” is ON
14.0 Put the operation key in the position “APPROXIMATE CONTROL ROD”
14.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the approximate
control rod of the reactor core
14.2 Observe indicator lamp “APPROXIMATE CONTROL ROD IN” is OFF
15.0 Check (Evaluate) data from nuclear instrumentation
15.1 Observe the analogue meters of the pulse channel located in the control
desk: counts equal to 10,000 counts per second
15.2 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel located in the control
desk: power increasing
16.0 Turn off the high voltage power supply of the pulse channel
17.0 Observe the analogue meters of the gamma radiation monitors
18.0 Put the operation key in the position “COARSE CONTROL ROD”
18.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the coarse control
rod of the reactor core
18.2 Observe indicator lamp “COARSE CONTROL ROD IN” is OFF
Table 3 (continued )
Operator actions
19.0 Observe the analogue meters of the gamma radiation monitors
20.0 Put the operation key in the position “ACCURATE CONTROL ROD”
20.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the accurate control
rod of the reactor core
20.2 Observe indicator lamp “ACCURATE CONTROL ROD IN” is OFF
21.0 Observe the analogue meters of the gamma radiation monitors
22.0 Monitor power channel
22.1 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel are measuring eighty
(80%) power
22.2 Observe nuclear reactor power does not decrease and remains at eighty
(80%) power
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cording to Mumaw et al. (1995), two types of triggers initiate
monitoring. The ﬁrst category is called “data-driven events” that
comprise indication received through meters, sensors, interfaces;
visual and auditory alarms from control room. The second category
is called “Knowledge-driven events” deﬁned by a set of standard
practices or plant procedures, such as written records of instru-
mentation tests and signiﬁcant alarms; scheduled tasks; work
permits; information about equipment taken out of service and
formal check procedures.
In this phase, the purpose was to produce a summary of actions
as they have been carried out by the operators. In order to ensure
the reliability of the actions description, we used different sources
of information, such as operating manuals, diary operation register
and the data collected through operator activity analysis. In sce-
nario one, the description of the actions carried out by operator is
shown in Table 3. In scenario two, the description of the actions
carried out by operator is shown in Table 4.
Using Mumaw et al. (1995) model, scenario one and scenario
two were analyzed. The purpose was to identify actions where the
operator exhibited higher-level cognitive activity and suggest sys-
tems that could be modernized, in order to support cognitive
process activities. According to Hollnagel (1998, chap. 9) and Vicent
and Burns (1996), the purpose of a cognitive demand proﬁle is to
indicate whether operator actions as a whole are likely to depend
on a speciﬁc set of cognitive functions. If so, the conditions where
these cognitive functions are required should be further analyzed.
The description of the operator actions sequence (Tables 3 and 4) is
reﬁned by identifying the cognitive functions that characterize each
action (Figs. 6 and 7).
As it can be seen from Fig. 6, the ﬁrst segment of the actions
carried out by the operator is called initial veriﬁcation. It involves the
actions number one up to number four. It is dominated by moni-
toring (40%) and situation assessment (30%), involving little response
planning (20%) and response implementation (10%). The second
segment of the actions is called start-up. It involves the actions
number ﬁve up to number twelve. It is dominated by response
implementation (46.43%) and monitoring (39.29%), involving little
situation assessment (7.14%) and response planning (7.14%). The third
segment of the actions is called increase reactor power. It involves
the actions number thirteen up to number twenty-two. It is domi-
nated by monitoring (54.17%) and response implementation
(33.33%), involving little situation assessment (2.33%) and response
planning (4.17%). For veriﬁcation initial, the results suggest that the
modernization of systems related to monitoring and situation
assessment can improve operator performance. For start-up, the
results suggest that the modernization of systems related to
response implementation and monitoring can improve operator
performance. For increase reactor power, the results suggest that the
Table 4
Scenario two.
Operator actions
1.0 Turn on power supply of the control desk (Execute)
2.0 Check indicator lamps
2.1 Observe indicator lamp “POWER SUPPLY” is ON
2.2 Observe indicator lamp “NEUTRON SOURCE IN” is OFF
3.0 Check data from nuclear instrumentation
3.1 Observe the analogue meters of the pulse channel located in the control
desk: counts less than 10 pulses per second
3.2 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel located in the control
desk: no power
4.0 Recorder water conditions
4.1Temperature
4.2 PH
4.3 Resistivity
5.0 Put the operation key in the position “SOURCE”
5.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and insert the neutron source
5.2 Observe indicator lamp “NEUTRON SOURCE IN” is ON
6.0 Check data from nuclear instrumentation
6.1 Observe the analogue meters of the pulse channel located in the control
desk: counts greater than 10 pulses per second
6.2 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel located in the control
desk: no power
7.0 Put the joystick control in the position “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 1”
7.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the safety rod number
1 of the reactor core
7.2 Observe indicator lamp “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 1” is OFF
8.0 Put the joystick control in the position “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 2”
8.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the safety rod number
2 of the reactor core
8.2 Observe indicator lamp “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 2” is OFF
9.0 Put the joystick control in the position “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 3”
9.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the safety rod number
3 of the reactor core
9.2 Observe indicator lamp “SAFETY ROD NUMBER 3” is OFF
10.0 Turn on the power switch of the drain valve
10.1 Put the joystick control in the position “DRAIN VALVE”
10.2 Close “DRAIN VALVE”
10.3 Observe indicator lamp “DRAIN VALVE CLOSED” is ON
10.4 Put the joystick control in the position “WATER LEVEL”
11.0 Turn on the power supply of the main pump
11.1 Observe indicator lamp “MAIN PUMP” is ON
11.2 Observe indicator lamp “WATER LEVEL HIGH” is ON
12.0 Check data from nuclear instrumentation
12.1 Observe the analogue meters of the pulse channel located in the control
desk: counts increasing
12.2 Observe the analogue meters of the power channel located in the control
desk: no power
13.0 Switch on the key called “CONTROL RODS”
13.1 Verify indicator lamp “CONTROL RODS” is ON
13.2 Verify indicator lamp “CONTROL RODS IN” is ON
14.0 Put the operation key in the position “APPROXIMATE CONTROL ROD”
14.1 Put the joystick control in the up position and remove the approximate
control rod of the reactor core
14.2 Verify indicator lamp “APPROXIMATE CONTROL ROD” is OFF
15.0 Vary the alarm level of the gamma radiationmonitoring device located in
the reactor hall
15.1 Observe alarms indicator from gamma radiation monitoring device is ON
15.2 Verify approximate control rod was introduced automatically in the
reactor core
15.3 Verify reactor is shutdown
I.J.A. Luquetti dos Santos et al. / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 26 (2013) 1308e13201316modernization of systems related to monitoring and response
implementation can improve operator performance.
As it can be seen from Fig. 7, the ﬁrst segment of the actions
carried out by the operator is called initial veriﬁcation. It involvesthe actions number one up to number four. It is dominated by
monitoring (40%) and situation assessment (30%), involving little
response planning (20%) and response implementation (10%). The
second segment of the actions is called start-up. It involves the
actions number ﬁve up to number twelve. It is dominated by
response implementation (46.43%) and monitoring (39.29%),
involving little situation assessment (7.14%) and response planning
(7.14%). The third segment of the actions is called increase reactor
power. It involves the actions number thirteen up to number
fourteen. It is dominated by monitoring (50%) and response
implementation (50%), no involving situation assessment and
response planning. The fourth segment of the actions is called
reactor shutdown. It involves the actions number ﬁfteen. It is
dominated by monitoring (57.14%), situation assessment (28.57%),
involving little response implementation (14.29%), no involving
response planning. For veriﬁcation initial, the results suggest that
the modernization of systems related to monitoring and situation
assessment can improve operator performance. For start-up, the
results suggest that the modernization of systems related to
response implementation and monitoring can improve operator
performance. For increase reactor power, the results suggest that
the modernization of systems related to monitoring and response
implementation can improve operator performance. For reactor
shutdown, the results suggest that the modernization of systems
related to monitoring and situation assessment can improve
operator performance. The results are shown in Table 5
Direct or indirect operator support systems can be modernized
or added to control desk to support cognitive activities. The most
appropriate support system can be selected based on the cognitive
process (Lee & Seong, 2007). Information displays, nuclear instru-
mentation and gamma radiation monitoring system support
monitoring. In addition, information displays, nuclear instrumen-
tation and alarms system support situation assessment, enhancing
operational efﬁciency (Fig. 8). The results presented in Fig. 8 and
Table 5, associated with human factors questionnaire results and
interviews with operators, allowed to recommend the design of a
new alarm panel.
5.4. Alarm panel development
In meetings, the multidisciplinary team deﬁned which variables
the alarm panel was intended to measure and outlined the design
goals. Industrial designer was responsible for the initial sketch of
the physical design and details about the information to be pre-
sented in alarm panel, given the need to integrate ergonomics re-
quirements into this process. Operators provided information to
human factors expert in response to questions related to their
needs and difﬁculties related to operation using information from
the old alarms. This step was ﬁnished with the deﬁnition of func-
tional requirements, presented below:
- the alarm panel will be included in a rack to be positioned on
the right side of the control console operator;
- coding scheme used by the alarm panel should assure rapid
detection and interpretation by the operators under all control
room operating conditions;
- color, position and shape will be employed for priority coding;
- each color should have a single, precise meaning that is
consistent with applicable population stereotypes;
- alarms will be indicated both by visual and audible means;
- when the parameter returns to the normal range from an
abnormal range, the return to normal conditions will be indi-
cated by visual and audible means;
- alarms should be organized into categories according to
priority;
Fig. 6. List of cognitive functions (Scenario one).
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- two alarms of attention related to the operation have been
deﬁned.
The alarm panel is presented in Fig. 9.6. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to propose a methodology
framework to evaluate nuclear control room, including human
factor questionnaire and operator activity analysis, through two
Fig. 7. List of cognitive functions (Scenario two).
Table 5
Cognitive functions applied to scenario one and two.
Scenario Operation modes Systems modernization
Monitoring Situation
assessment
Response
implementation
1 Initial veriﬁcation
Start-up
Increase power
2 Initial veriﬁcation
Start-up
Increase power
Reactor shutdown
The gray shading explains that during the scenarios one and two and operations
mode which cognitive functions were used.
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that the operator activity analysis associated with human factors
questionnaire can be used as a support tool to the evaluation pro-
cess. In this paper, the overall results showed a positive and sig-
niﬁcant contribution of multidisciplinary team. It reﬂects the
importance of having a group of professionals from diverse disci-
plines, with different technical formation, who together provides
decisions, actions, coordination and assists in the choice of sce-
narios. The design solutions were made considering the appro-
priate use of the control room, emphasizing that work practices
should be based on the notion that the human is the most impor-
tant link in complex socio-technical systems. What we really need
are control rooms that support actions of the operators. To do so,
control rooms must be designed considering that the users need to
be taken account in all the phases of the design process. In order to
design useful operator support systems, human cognitive process
Fig. 8. Systems modernization based on cognitive process model.
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cognitive functions (monitoring, situation assessment, response
planning and response implementation) have implications for the
development and modernization of operator support system. The
use of methodological framework made possible a series of
recommendation for the adequacy of the control room design,
assisting in the identiﬁcation of ergonomics problems in the panel
label, controls, working environment and alarms, and whether
sufﬁcient information was available to allow operator to make
decisions when required. The ﬁndings assisted in the safety
assessment of the control room design and were used as a basic for
recommendations, justifying the alarm panel modernization.
Future plans include the use of quantitative analysis methods,
such as AHP and fuzzy set theory, for the identiﬁcation and prior-
itization of non-compliant ergonomic criteria related to control
room design. Through the development of a computational tool,
based on the human factors questionnaire, will be possible to rankFig. 9. Alarm panel 3D model.the experts based on professional experience and identify among
the design problems evaluated as high risk, which will be corrected
with a higher priority.
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